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ABSTRACT 
 The latest developments on the international scene have made the safety factor an 
unavoidable issue in international relations and political debate. Today, the world we are 
living in is facing complex threats coming from the largest modern international security 
danger - terrorism. Terrorists intensify their activities using violence as a means of political 
action and create an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability. The trend of using 
unconventional methods of warfare, tactics and procedures continued during the first and 
second decade of the XXI century, causing unconventional resources to become the 
dominant mode of extremist activity worldwide. The use of unconventional weapons 
brings great success and losses and is also accompanied by great media attention, which is 
one of the main goals of the extremists that will be presented in this paper. The relatively 
easy access to weapons and bio-chemical substances is an effective and relatively easy tool 
to use against civilians and against security structures. Extremists will continue to change 
and promote their tactics, techniques and procedures of action in view of inflicting 
maximum damage with minimum risk. Afghanistan is facing a complex threat from 
terrorism throughout their territory, which historically refers to the period starting from 
1979. These extremist terrorist activities include the use of conventional weapons and 
conventional mode of action and use of improvised explosive devices as a way to inflict 
serious losses on the forces in Afghanistan. Statistics show an enormous number of civilian 
casualties as a result of the use of unconventional weapons and improvised explosive 
devices in the territory of Afghanistan, among which the most frequently used include the 
so-called "vest" terrorist bombers and improvised explosive devices - "car bombs". 
 
 Keywords: terrorism, Afghanistan, a suicide bomber, car bomb, an explosive 
device 
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THE EXECUTION OF TERRORIST ATTACKS WITH IMPROVISED 
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES IN AFGHANISTAN 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the course of 2012 and the first half of 2013, according to the available 
information, an exceptionally high number of movements in lines had been noticed by the 
international security forces, the Afghan national security forces and the international 
factor throughout Afghanistan. The potential danger from improvised explosive devices is 
still present, given the fact that their use still remains to be the most practiced tactic of the 
extremists and the antigovernment elements. It has been shown that this is one of the 
effective ways of intimidation, where the psychological effects of the incidents with 
improvised explosive devices are directed towards the local population, despite the efforts 
of the international military presence and the Afghan national security forces to fight these 
occurrences. The estimation that follows is a compilation and analysis of the tactics, 
techniques and procedures which are used by the extremists and antigovernment elements 
in Afghanistan and their influence on the general safety situation. 
 
1. Defining the improvised explosive device1 
According to the explanation given by the dictionary of the US Department of 
Defense, ―an improvised explosive device is a device which is set or produced in an 
improvised manner, which contains destructive, deadly, dangerous pyrotechnical or 
inflammable chemicals and is created with the purpose to destroy, incapacitate, attack 
or draw attention. It may contain military materials, however this improvised device is 
mainly created by components of no military nature.‖ 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1 -  An example of an improvised explosive device manufactured in domestic 
environment and found in a house in ―Helmand Province‖ in Afghanistan in May, 2009, 
UNAMA, UN, Safety device, intern report 
 
  
                                                     
1 www.securitymanagement.com/library/000339.html. 
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1.2 General characteristics of the improvised explosive devices used in 
Afghanistan
2
 
 
The improvised explosive devices can be divided into several categories. Namely, 
these devices include: 
- Bombs planted along the way, 
- Booby traps, 
- Vest-bombs worn by suicide bombers, 
- Bombs in vehicles, 
- Static bombs, or bombs carried by suicide bombers, and 
- Different improvised explosive devices with a shaped charge. 
Essentially, any explosive weaponry that does not come from industrial production can be 
considered an improvised explosive device. In Afghanistan, the improvised explosive 
devices are produced with diesel fuel and sometimes mortar rounds or metal plates are 
used. Some of the devices use a cell phone as a remote control. However, some improvised 
explosive devices can explode by giving a signal through a button, or with the touch of 
wires and batteries. Thanks to the Internet, in recent years there has been an advancement 
in the techniques for creating improvised explosive devices. Most of the improvised 
explosive devices are special in some way, because the creator improvises with the 
material available to him at the given moment. The improvised explosive devices are 
created to defeat a certain target or type of targets, so they are harder to be discovered or 
prevented, because as time goes by they have an increasingly complex structure.  
 
1.3 Components of the improvised explosive devices according to the registered 
incidents in Afghanistan 
Generally, the improvised explosive devices have four main components: 
- Energy source, 
- Initiator, 
- Explosive, and 
- Switch. 
 
 
Picture 2 - An example of a set improvised explosive device with remote control 
 
                                                     
2 www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-18- 2012/august/ieds-the-home-made-
bombs-that-changed-modern-war/ 
28 
 
The energy source fuels the system of the improvised explosive device with electric 
energy. Most improvised explosive devices have an electric plant, which as such, seeks a 
source of electric energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 3- An example of an energy source 
The initiator causes an explosion of the main charge and they can be improvised 
explosives or explosives of high quality. The main charge must be activated, because it 
will not explode by itself.  
 The explosive material or the explosive is a reactive substance which contains a 
large quantity of potential energy, which creates an explosion when released all at once. 
Along with the explosion, it creates light, heat, sound and pressure.  
 The switch is found in the device as a switch for activation or a detonator. The 
switch can have a simple or complex structure. Many improvised explosive devices 
contain an activation switch, as well as a detonator-switch. The activation switch is a 
backup part of the improvised explosive device and acts through deactivation (electric 
disabling) of the detonator switch. When the activation switch is armed, the detonation 
switch functions, however the wheel is still closed. When the detonation switch is 
activated, then the wheel is opened, the battery charge is connected to the initiator (a hat 
that explodes) and the detonation takes place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 4 - An example of switches 
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1.4 Ways of delivering the improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan 
1.4.1. Wire-controlled improvised explosive devices 
The wire-controlled improvised explosive devices are activated with the help of a moving 
wire. The command wire-controlled improvised explosive devices are set in motion by a 
moving operator. A special modified type of this improvised explosive device is the one 
that is directed by the victim itself and is activated by the target itself, while moving 
through so called plates under pressure.  
 
 
Picture 5 - An example of a wire-controlled improvised explosive device 
1.4.2. Car-bomb 
 Car-bombs are automobiles or trucks full of explosives. A special kind of a car-
bomb is a vehicle which has an explosive device installed underneath (Sub-vehicle borne). 
These vehicles are controlled by suicide bombers on the territory of Afghanistan. The 
construction of these devices needs a lot more time and knowledge of logistics than the 
construction of other types of improvised explosive devices. However, the use of vehicles 
enables the delivery or setting of higher quantities of explosives on the planned targets in a 
faster manner. The use of multi-purpose car-bombs against a single target can improve the 
attack itself. The vehicle bombs use higher quantities of explosives and the explosive 
charge varies between 45-450kg. The explosive charge may contain parts like grenades, 
mine-throwers, projectile motors, rockets, warheads, C4 explosives and artillery grenades. 
The attack technique of car-bombs is increasingly present and includes the use of 
multipurpose vehicles. In such cases, the leading or the first vehicle is used as a bait or a 
destroyer of barriers. This was one of the most commonly used methods as part of a 
―complex attack‖ in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2014.  
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Picture 6 - A vehicle-bomb with 107mm rockets discovered in the Kunduz Province, 
Afghanistan, according to UNAMA, UN Security Administration, intern report – 
document.    
 
1.4.2.1. Indicators 
 The following characteristics can be indicators of a possible risk posed by a car-
bomb: 
-Lowered vehicle: A visibly lowered vehicle on the suspension is a sign of a large 
quantity of explosives. 
-Covered windows: Darkened or covered windows to hide the content of the 
vehicle. 
-Unusual items inside the vehicle: fuel cylinders, wires, leaflets, large bags or 
cardboards and batteries in addition to the usual batteries (accumulators) for the vehicle. 
-Abandoned vehicles: The presence of vehicles in the area where their presence is 
not usual. 
-Holes in the vehicles: Holes made in the vehicle itself to conceal the explosives, 
which are roughly covered. 
-Changes on the doors from the inside: Proof that the part from the inside is 
removed to hider the explosive.  
-Presence of gunpowder: The presence of gunpowder that remains after the 
explosive materials have been loaded in the vehicle. 
- Recently painted vehicle: recently painted vehicle to cover the vehicle‘s changes. 
-Additional fuel tanks: The presence of additional fuel tanks. 
-Unusual smell: Unusual smells, for example the smell of timed fuse, gasoline or 
waste. 
-Additional antennas: The presence of additional antennas on the vehicle for radio 
controlled devices. 
Indicators for drivers of car-bombs: 
 -Irregular driving speed: Irregular driving speed, driving too slow or too fast when 
passing in front of the Afghan Government and the controlled security stations. 
 -Ignoring orders: Ignoring the orders to stop, an attempt to go around a controlled 
security station or an attempt to maneuver, especially to get close to the locations of the 
international military forces. 
 -Improper clothing: wearing improper dress or improper clothing for driving such 
a vehicle. Also, signs of anxiety, sweating, trembling or unusual expression. 
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 -Number of people in the vehicle: The presence of a driver only in the vehicle is 
common for the operations of car-bombs. However, there can be any number of people in 
the vehicle, except if the person that drives the car-bomb is not a suspect. 
 -Difficulties that the driver faces: The inability for the driver to properly move the 
vehicle or use the equipment he/she has.  
 
1.4.2.2. Tactics, techniques and procedures of the car-bombs used in Afghanistan 
 The primary purpose of car-bombs is to attack fixed targets. They are used in 
several attacks of the controlled stations of the international military forces, as well as their 
infrastructure. However, car-bombs are also used for convoys. The tactics, techniques and 
procedures of the car-bombs used by the rebels in Afghanistan are as follows: 
 -Multipurpose vehicles: Three vehicles are used to escort the car-bomb. The first 
vehicle is a hunter – its purpose is to identify the targets. The second vehicle carries a 
person with a camera, whose task is to film the event. The third vehicle is the car-bomb. 
 -Car-bait: The first or the leading vehicle serves as the bait, it draws the attention 
of the security forces from the car-bomb, which approaches fast. 
 -Destroyed vehicles: The car-bombs are made from the remains of destroyed 
vehicles, or damaged vehicles on the road; when the convoy passes near a car-bomb, it is 
activated from a distance. Some of the vehicles that have not been used long and can be 
found near the road can be turned into an immobile fixed car-bomb. 
 
1.4.3. Remotely controlled improvised explosive device 
 The detonation is mainly controlled from a distance with different wireless 
devices. They are taken out of remote controls for toys (with the reach of around 100 
meters) to transmitters (with the reach of around 5 kilometers). They may also use car 
alarms and keyless entry systems (reach of around 200 meters), wireless phones (reach of 
around 100 meters) and cell phones.  
 
 
 
Picture 7- Examples of improvised explosive devices with remote controlled transmitters 
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1.4.4. Magnetically set improvised explosive devices  
 There are many kinds of magnetically attached improvised explosive devices used 
in the region of Afghanistan. One of the most common is the so called ―sticky bomb‖ – an 
improvised explosive device set in the vehicle‘s engine. In practice, the bomb is usually 
connected with a masking tape or magnets. The antigovernment elements and extremists 
use a wide range of devices to hide the magnetically improvised explosive devices. 
 
 
Picture 8 - Examples of magnetically attached improvised explosive devices and their 
setting 
 
 
Picture 9 - Locations with detonation of magnetically attached improvised explosive 
devices, in which ISAF transport vehicles are burned, Samangan Province, Afghanistan, 
July 2012, according to UNAMA, UN, Security Administration, intern report – document. 
 
1.4.5. Improvised explosive devices – vest3 
 The suicide bombers in the region of Afghanistan in most registered cases use a 
jacket full of explosives and they activate the device themselves or through another 
operator from a distance. The suicide bomber poses a notably great danger to the safety of 
the international security forces personnel and civilians. The purpose of these terrorists is 
not only to commit suicide, but also to kill or injure as many soldiers or other civilians as 
possible. The suicide bombers mainly use highly explosive and fragmented effects and a 
command system for detonation, or in other words, some kind of a switch or button that is 
activated manually. The explosives with the fragments can be carried in a vest, belt or 
                                                     
3 Kix, P.: ―The Truth About Suicide Bombers,‖ Boston Globe, December 5, 2010.  
 
33 
 
specially manufactured clothes where the explosive is hidden. The suicide bomber usually 
wears clothing or a belt that contains explosives. Unlike the former robust devices, today 
the devices are particularly small and the explosive can be easily hidden. 
 
 
Picture 10 - Suicide bombers General description of the acting of improvised explosive 
devices during the execution of terrorist acts in Afghanistan 
 
The improvised explosive devices remain one of the biggest threats facing the 
civilians, the international military presence and the Afghan security forces in Afghanistan. 
One example indicates that in the period January – June 2012, the improvised explosive 
devices caused 29% of the total number of deaths of civilians. 
According to the International Organization for Victim Assistance, since the beginning of 
2012 there have been 108 victims of the International Security Assistance Force – ISAF 
caused by improvised explosive devices, out of the total 240 deaths, as a result of these 
incidents, or 45% of the total number of deaths. 
 According to the information of UNAMA, the Department for human rights, 
improvised explosive devices were the single greatest killer of Afghan children, men and 
women in 2011, taking 967 lives of civilians or nearly one out of every three victims 
(32%) murdered in the conflict. The improvised explosive devices were the cause of 41% 
of civilian victims related to the antigovernment elements. In 2012, the improvised 
explosive devices continued to be the greatest threat to civilians. Antigovernment elements 
continued using improvised explosive devices in a way that is threatening and illegal. For 
example – in the period from January 1 to June 30, 2012, the improvised explosive devices 
were the specific reason behind 33% of all civilian victims, killing 327 and injuring 689 
civilians. Considering the tactics used by improvised explosive devices, like the suicide 
and complex attacks, the improvised explosive devices caused a total of 53% of the victims 
and injured civilians during the first six months of 2012. According to the United Nations 
report, it is concluded that most of the improvised explosive devices that caused civilian 
victims were not directed towards a certain military target, but were regularly set on the 
sides of the roads, resulting in terrifying deaths and injuries of civilians while breaking the 
international humanitarian law.  
 In 2012, a large percentage of improvised explosive devices was discovered and 
deactivated by members of the international military forces before they were used, 
however the antigovernment elements and extremists are trying to improve these devices 
and find better and more effective ways of their use. During the period of January – June 
2012, according to the UN mission in Afghanistan, there were 1195 detonations noted and 
1490 improvised explosive devices were found.  
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 The increased activity of attacks with improvised explosive devices in 2012 – 
2013 implies that the operations of the international military forces and the antigovernment 
forces progressively destroyed the rebels‘ capacity of executing direct attacks. This 
indicates that the rebels, instead of being defeated, turned to other tactics and their 
continuous ability to execute serious attacks and maintain control over the local population 
can be noted. 
 
2. General features of the operations with improvised explosive devices in 
Afghanistan
4
 
Historically speaking, the first improvised explosive devices were used by the 
Mujahideen in the fight against the Russians. Starting six months before the invasion of the 
USSR in Afghanistan, on December 27 1979, the Afghan militants possessed high 
quantities of military equipment. There were different kinds of anti-tank mines between 
them. The rebels removed the explosive from several anti-tank mines and combined them 
with a can of cooking oil, with the purpose of creating a stronger explosion. After the 
detonation of the improvised explosive devices, the users would use weapons to ―open 
fire‖, like automatic rifles and rocket grenades, with the purpose of continuing the attack. 
Since 2001, the Taliban and other antigovernment elements used improvised explosive 
devices in the fight against the international military forces and the Afghan forces, but not 
against civilian targets. The increased use of improvised explosive devices indicates the 
determination of the rebels to avoid victims in conventional armed conflicts. The 
improvised explosive devices became a weapon which gives an advantage and whose 
effects are the main cause of victims. Currently, in Afghanistan the improvised explosive 
devices can be made of any kind of material and designed in such a way that they can kill 
or seriously wound the wanted target, kill or incapacitate their victims. Considering the 
small number of asphalt roads in Afghanistan, it is relatively easy to set up any kind of 
device without any track. 
 
2.1 Attacks with use of improvised explosive devices 
In the last couple of years, the engagement of extremists and antigovernment elements 
whose acting is spread across the territory of Afghanistan, has led to an improvement in 
the tactics of the attack in several cases on a very high technological, operative and 
executive level. The complexity of some attacks indicates an increased level of training in 
camps and improved availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry, reforming the 
way of executing the attack, as well as a highly developed logistic support - the infiltration 
with using vehicles, which are completely identical to those of the international security 
forces, uniforms of the operatives – perpetrators of the attacks which are identical with 
those worn by the international forces and the members of the Ministry of Defense and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan. The identity documents and passports used to 
infiltrate the attackers are very high quality copies. On the basis of the analysis of the 
extremist attacks in the last 10 years used in Afghanistan, the most efficient has been 
identified as the tactic called ―complex attack‖. According to the definition of the UN 
mission in Afghanistan, ―a complex attack‖ is an intentional and coordinated attack 
which uses a suicidal improvised explosive device (ex. car-bomb, suicide bomber 
                                                     
4 Lankford, A.: ―Could Suicide Terrorists Actually Be Suicidal?‖ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (2011), 
337-366; Ronald W. Maris. 
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etc.), with more than one attacker and more than one kind of weapon and explosive 
device (ex. a suicide bomber armed with a rocket launcher).  All three elements must be 
present in the attacks, so that it can be considered ―complex‖. 
 
2.2 Potential indicators of the improvised explosive devices 
The attacks with improvised explosive devices can occur at any time. These means are 
mainly set during the night when the visibility is limited. Even when the improvised 
explosive device does not kill or wound the victim, the danger complicates the movement 
of different convoys of the security forces, the international organization, the UN and 
civilians. Up to date analyses indicate that the networks controlled by the extremists, 
including the Taliban, are multilevel. They include financiers, logistic experts, experts for 
improvised explosive devices and trainers. At the bottom of the ladder are those that set the 
bombs, usually farmers and shepherds paid 10$ or less to dig holes or be engaged as 
observers. 
Indicators for potential improvised explosive devices are as follows: 
-Wires. Electrical wires, batteries, traps, cables etc. 
-Markers. Markers are used to activate the improvised explosive device at the right time. 
Usually, capacities are needed to be used as markers. When the vehicle passes the marker, 
the operator of the improvised explosive device can activate the device at the right time. 
-Shapes of objects that are unusual for that environment. 
-Unexploded explosive device 
-Vehicles: abandoned vehicles, war equipment, weapons, uniforms, documents 
-Terrain abnormality: Footprints that suddenly stop, fresh holes, new dust, lots of stones 
are indicators that someone buried something there recently, which can be an improvised 
explosive device. 
-Unusual vehicle behavior: The vehicles behave unusually, follow the convoys or are far 
ahead of them, a car parked on the side of the road with activated turn signals are also 
indicators that something is not right. 
-Road barriers: The man-made road barriers can be set so they can obstruct the vehicles or 
direct the convoy before the attack with an improvised explosive device. 
-Changes in the way of life: Sudden absence of playing children, normal traffic course and 
other daily activities can be an indicator that something is going to happen. 
 
2.3 Possible locations for setting improvised explosive devices 
 Possible locations for setting improvised explosive devices are the following: 
-Roads as a main or secondary communication, unpaved roadsides, the devices can also be 
buried under the road surface, in the vehicle tires of the Afghan security forces and the 
international military forces, or in the channels for underground cables under the road. 
-Road holes. The improvised explosive devices can be set in the holes of the road, inside, 
around or under any kind of package or cargo. 
 Locations that are identified as especially suitable for setting improvised explosive 
devices in Afghanistan are: 
-Soft sand 
-Sharp parts 
-Riverbeds, channels for underground cables 
-On hillsides or through them 
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Picture 11 – Examples for set improvised explosive devices on the road 
 
2.3 Roads of delivery of the improvised explosive devices to Afghanistan 
The delivery of the improvised explosive devices to Afghanistan can be from Pakistan, 
Iran or the former USSR countries. According to the information from JIEDDO 
(Pentagon‘s Joint IED Defeat Organization – organization for fighting the improvised 
explosive devices), Pakistan is the source of 80% of the bombs in Afghanistan, which are 
domestic and based on fertilizers that cause 90% of the victims from the members of the 
international military forces. The porous border with Pakistan is a big problem in the fight 
against terrorism. Almost all devices found in the southern provinces Helmand and 
Kandahar contain explosives made of ammonium nitrate. The most common form of 
domestic explosive is ANFO, which is a combination of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and 
diesel fuel, which makes it highly explosive. Although it is not legal in Afghanistan, it is 
still produced in Pakistan in large quantities and smuggled across the border. There are 
collaborative efforts of the security forces to discover and prevent the smuggling of 
fertilizer with calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Almost 
80% of the improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan contain domestic explosive, 
mainly CAN which is smuggled from Pakistan. On many security forums in Afghanistan, 
Iran is accused of supplying weapons for the Afghan rebels, including the explosively 
formed penetrator (EFP). This type of improvised explosive device, according to the 
available information, was successfully used by the Shiite militants against armored 
vehicles (as it is previously stated, there are no confirmed reports of using the EFP on the 
territory of Afghanistan). What has been found, according to the ISAF sources, is 
commercially manufactured Iranian merchandise like batteries and bulb wires. It is known 
that some of the components necessary to create an improvised explosive device come 
through the transparent borders of the former Soviet Union. There are some presumptions 
that some commercial explosives used by the rebels are manufactured in the countries of 
the former Soviet Union, where the weapon industry is well developed.  
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2.4 Most distinctive attacks in Kabul with the use of improvised explosive  
 
Devices as part of the tactics, techniques and procedures of the extremists. 
The following table shows the suicide attacks in Kabul executed in the period between 
December 2012 and June 2013, with the use of improvised explosive devices. 
DATE DAY TIME TARGET EXTREMIST 
TACTIC 
December 2012  19:00 The head of the national 
security directorate 
1 suicide bomber 
(explosives in the 
body – rectal part) 
16 January 2013 Wednesday 12:12 National security 
directorate 
Combined attack: 1 
car-bomb + 6 
suiciders 
21 January 2013 Monday 05:50 Main headquarters of 
the traffic police 
5 suiciders 
27 February 
2013 
Wednesday 07:30 Afghan army – 
employee transport bus 
1 suicider 
9 March 2013 Saturday 09:00 Ministry of Defense 1 suicider 
16 May 2013 Thursday 08:00 ISAF Convoy 1 car bomb 
24 May 2013 Friday 16:05 International migration 
organization of the UN 
combined attack: 1 
car-bomb + 4 
suiciders 
10 June 2013 Monday 04:40 ISAD camp on the 
north-eastern end of the 
international Kabul 
airport 
7 suiciders 
11 June 2013 Tuesday 16:14 High Court in Kabul 1 car-bomb 
25 June 2013 Tuesday 06:30 President palace in 
Kabul 
8 suiciders 
 
2 July 2013 Tuesday 04:33 Logistic camp 
„Pinnacle―in Kabul 
Combined attack:   1 
car-bomb + 3 
suiciders 
25 November 
2014 
Tuesday 06:30 Kabul Magnet bomb 
11 December 
2014 
Thursday 07:15 Kabul Suicide bomber 
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Picture 12 – The attack on June 11, 2013, which caused 17 victims and 40 wounded, 
but also damage on 48 vehicles 
 
 
Picture 13 – The attack on November 25, 2014 in Kabul 
 
Picture 13 – The attack on December 11, 2014 in Kabul 
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Conclusion and recommendations 
One of the leading threats presented in this paper is the use of improvised explosive 
devices through reputed modalities of production on the territory of Afghanistan. As 
stated, the potential danger of improvised explosive devices is still present, because their 
use still remains the most practiced tactic of the extremists and antigovernment elements. It 
has been shown that it is one of the effective ways of intimidation, where the psychological 
effect of the incidents with improvised explosive devices on the local population is 
unmatched, despite the efforts of the international military presence and the Afghan 
national security force to fight these events. On the basis of the reported statistical data, it 
is concluded that the improvised explosive devices continue to be the largest threat that the 
civilians, the international military forces and the Afghan security forces face in 
Afghanistan. The trend of large numbers of civilian victims and victims from the members 
of the security forces in Afghanistan confirm the data presented by this study, covering the 
period 2012-2014. Further analysis of the statistical data points out that the improvised 
explosive devices were the greatest killer of Afghan children, men and women in 2011, 
taking the lives of 967 civilians or nearly one of three civilian victims (32%) killed in the 
conflict. The improvised explosive devices were the reason behind 41% of civilian victims 
related to the attacks of the antigovernment elements. As stated, even in 2012 the 
improvised explosive devices remained to be the biggest threat for civilians and that trend 
continued in the first half of 2013, which contributes to the most important incidents stated 
in the paper. 
The activities which are the basis of any kind of initiative in the fight against terrorism 
in Afghanistan include: 
-Building the required capacity through training and education, as well as equipping 
the security forces in direction of discovering the improvised explosive devices and 
preventing terrorist activities. 
-Establishing an elite antiterrorist unit, which will be adequately equipped and 
financed by the government with the purpose of dislocating the terrorists in the country, 
through special operations for catching and eliminating the extremists who are inclined to 
violence. 
-Improving the legal capacities and adopting a strong and sustainable strategy for the 
security forces, led by investigating and informative acting in direction of identifying the 
threats which are multidimensional and international in their nature, such as terrorism, 
through the exchange of information and coordination between the countries in the region. 
-Identifying the threats, vulnerability and risk evaluation and a wide-range concept of 
security management, which must be integrated in the process of building the capacities of 
the security forces with the purpose of addressing the phenomenon of terrorism from the 
perspective of risk management. 
-Implementation of sanctions against the persons, business and financial entities in the 
region, identified as facilitators in the transfer of cash for the terrorists through their 
internal financial systems with the purpose of money laundering.  
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